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ABOLISHING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A RESPONSE TO JUDGE
WOOD
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss*

Got along without ya before I met you
[Can I] get along without ya now? 1
Chief Judge Diane Wood’s discussion of appellate authority over patent
law brings a welcome new voice to the debate over the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence.2 Her article adds considerable insight into the process of appellate
court decision making and provides an insider’s account of the value of
percolation in “sharpening” judicial writing, “testing” positions, and
occasionally persuading a judge that “someone else’s perspective is preferable.”3
In a follow-up interview, she elaborated on what she sees as a deliberative
deficit at the Federal Circuit:
I’ve been struck by how different [the Federal Circuit judges’] process is
from the other courts . . . . In the circuits, we pay attention to opinions of
other circuits and if we create conflict, we do it with our eyes open. We get
a real exchange of ideas in a way the Federal Circuit doesn’t.4

Judge Wood’s recommendation for changing the mechanism for
adjudicating patent appeals is provocative. To enrich the Federal Circuit’s
interchange with other federal appellate courts, she would bring the regional
circuits back into the game. That is, she would give appellants in patent cases a
choice between appealing to the Federal Circuit and appealing to the regional
court overseeing the district where the trial was held; in cases where both sides

*

Copyright © 2014 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss. I am grateful to the New York University
students in my 2013 Patent Law course who opted to answer an exam question on the
wisdom of Judge Wood’s proposal. Their views informed this discussion.
1
MILTON KELLEM, GONNA GET ALONG WITHOUT YA NOW (1952).
2
Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014).
3
Id. at 4–6.
4
Lisa Shuchman, Judge Wood Proposes Changing Jurisdiction for Patent Cases,
CORPORATE
COUNSEL
(Dec.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202621813096/Judge-Wood-Proposes-ChangingJurisdiction-for-Patent-Cases?slreturn=20140231134450.
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appeal, or when the same patent is put into issue in multiple courts, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) would choose the route of the appeal.5
Admittedly, I see Judge Wood’s contribution as especially welcome
because her views, if not her eclectic taste in music,6 are so close to my own. In
a speech last March at Southern Methodist University Law School, I noted
growing unrest with Federal Circuit law and cited as examples the Supreme
Court’s accelerating interest in reviewing—and reversing—the court’s
decisions,7 as well as critiques by organizations such as the National Academies,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services’ Committee on Genetics, Health & Society. 8 Like Judge Wood, I traced
this dissatisfaction to the long-term effects of abolishing opportunities for
percolation to the lack of robust exchange among appellate courts on novel
questions of patent law and to the system’s inability to exploit circuit boundaries
to experiment with solutions to the problems posed by disruptive innovations
and novel business models.
In my talk and in a subsequent article, I, like Judge Wood, proposed
institutional changes designed to expand the epistemic community.9 However,
my suggestions were very different from hers. First, I argued that recent
developments in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), including new
adjudicatory responsibilities under the America Invents Act (AIA),10 new
positions for economists and policy advisors, and satellite offices located in
important industrial centers, suggest that one way to enlarge the conversation
5

Wood, supra note 2, at 9–10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2006)).
See Wood, supra note 2, at 4, 6, 8 (citing the Dixie Chicks, Robin Thicke, and the
British New Wave Band).
7
See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent
Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013).
8
Office of Biological Studies, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH,
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and
-competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promo
tinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN
GENOMIC AND PROTEIN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 133–44 (2006);
COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE -BASED ECONOMY, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION :
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–36 (Oct. 2003).
9
See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 7.
10
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
6

would be to accord PTO decision-making greater deference. An obligation to
defer may raise questions about agency capture. However, it would have the
considerable advantage of requiring the Federal Circuit to grapple seriously with
the views of other experts—to wit, the technologists within the PTO. In
addition, greater deference would give the satellite offices space to experiment
with new legal approaches to the fields practiced by neighboring industries. If
these approaches were to remain in place long enough to determine how well
they work, the system would have an empirical basis on which to decide
whether they should be more widely adopted.11
Second, I noted that the new Patent Cases Pilot Program will put district
court judges in a position to enhance the impact of the PTO’s new role.12 As
with the satellite offices, the judges participating in the program will likely
develop special expertise in local technologies and gain unique perspectives on
the problems these industries encounter. These trial courts could provide the
Federal Circuit with an opportunity to debate not only the patentability questions
with which the PTO deals (nonobviousness, patentable subject matter,
disclosure, etc.), but also problems that arise at the enforcement stage (claim
construction, contributory liability, remedies, and the like). Additionally, they
will be in a position to watch these industries mature, to learn whether, over
time, patenting changes in significance, and to decide whether the law should be
modified to reflect industrial evolution. Deference to these select district courts
would also introduce a geographic variable and thus allow experimentation with
particular rules within each Pilot Program’s territory.13
Finally, I looked to developments in foreign countries. Somewhat
ironically, given the domestic unease with the Federal Circuit, other nations
have jumped on the specialization bandwagon. Over ninety countries have
adopted some form of specialized tribunal for patent (or intellectual property)
cases14 and the European Union is currently in the process of establishing a
Unified Patent Court, which would hear cases regarding the European Union’s
proposed Unitary Patent.15 Admittedly, the laws of other countries differ from
U.S. law, thus reducing opportunities for dialogue. However, obligations under
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
create many commonalities and common responsibilities. In addition, the AIA’s
switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file priority rule brings the US patent

11

Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 532–34.
Patent Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat.
3674, 3674–76 (2011).
13
Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 534–36.
14
ROHAZAR WATI ZUALLCOBLEY ET AL., INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., STUDY ON
SPECIALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS 2 (2012), available at http://iipi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/Study-on-Specialized-IPR-Courts.pdf.
15
Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/patent-court.html.
12
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regime into greater conformity with foreign law.16 Significantly, it also raises
questions that other countries have already answered. As a result, foreign courts
offer exciting opportunities for interchange and an experiential basis for
choosing among approaches to open questions.17
These proposals differ from Judge Wood’s in more than simply the
institution chosen to generate dialogue. Judge Wood’s idea, to revive the patent
jurisdiction of the regional circuits, reintroduces the exact sort of percolation
envisioned by the Evarts Act18—genuine interchange among courts of equal
stature. My proposals do not. Formal deference requirements, whether to the
PTO or to pilot program district courts, do not create conversations among
judges of equivalent authority; thus, they are unlikely to spark the same level of
sharpening, testing, and persuading. Moreover, there are those who would
question whether international exchanges could be at all fruitful.19 Nonetheless,
my proposals do something Judge Wood’s does not: they preserve the
exclusivity of the Federal Circuit. The question thus arises: now that the nation
has had thirty years’ experience with exclusivity in patent adjudication, can it
get along without it now?
This Essay is in two parts. Part I examines the policies underlying the
move to exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit and explains why
none of the proponents of the court thought the absence of percolation would be
a problem. Part II then considers Judge Wood’s proposal and shows how
profoundly it would undermine the objectives of those who established the
court. To be sure, in the thirty years of the court’s existence, much has changed;
accordingly, there is now reason to question the need for exclusivity.
Nonetheless, I conclude that this is not the time to bring the other circuits back
into patent adjudication. In the last three years, the Federal Circuit has
undergone rapid turnover with more expected in the near future.20 A bolus dose
of new judges is likely to affect deliberations in the court, especially as several
of these jurists have backgrounds (and priors) significantly different from those
who served in the past. In my view, it is worth waiting to see if this third
generation of judges will be the one to integrate into the judicial mainstream or

16
See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A
New Paradigm for International Harmonisation?, 24 SINGAPORE ACAD. L.J. 669 (2013).
17
Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 536–39.
18
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
19
Indeed, to some, citing foreign law should be an impeachable offense. See, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
1,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/politics/01scotus.html?_
r=1&ei=5094&en=75b1057f5338b27c&hp=&ex=1104642000&adxnnl=1&partner=hom
epage&adxnnlx=1104588958-mdVdpUq4V7dUVBvFBzqbpg; David J. Seipp, Our Law,
Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2006).
20
See generally Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).

become receptive to other mechanisms for improving the quality of patent law,
either through my proposals or those of other commentators.21

I. THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH A COURT WITH EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY
OVER PATENT LAW
The Federal Circuit’s history is well rehearsed elsewhere.22 For these
purposes, it is sufficient to note that of the two possible objectives for
establishing a specialized court—improving the efficiency of adjudication or
refining the quality of decisions—the former goal was clearly dominant in
Congress’s thinking.23 While some consideration was given to quality, the
overall aim was docket control. Indeed, the proceduralists of the day thought
little of the judiciary’s role in crafting law in statutory cases. Predictable law and
uniform national application were, of course, important because achieving these
objectives might well reduce the number of litigated cases. But accuracy—law
faithful to legislative intent, responsive to the needs of the patent industry, and
21

See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012) (suggesting
greater dialogue among federal agencies); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (suggesting
that one regional circuit be designated as an alternative to the Federal Circuit to hear
appeals from trial courts and that the D.C. Circuit share responsibility with the Federal
Circuit for appeals from the PTO); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime
Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 657, 720 (2009) (suggesting that the Supreme Court step on only when
it perceives the Federal Circuit rule as “ossified.”); Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1445 (2012) (proposing to revamp the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to include other commercial cases or consolidating it
into the D.C. Circuit).
22
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Specialized Courts]; see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn From the Supreme
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787 (2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827
(2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 Berkeley TECH. L.J. 787 (2008) [hereinafter Institutional
Identity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 760 (2004) [hereinafter Continuing Experiment];
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 412–14
(1990).
23
I use the term “specialized” with considerable imprecision. The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over a wide range of subject matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
However, it is specialized in the sense that it hears almost all the appeals of patent cases
in the nation. Moreover, these cases constitutes close to half the court’s docket (measured
by raw numbers). See Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2013, UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR
THE
FEDERAL
CIRCUIT,
available
at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/Statistics/fy%2013%20filings%20by%20cat
egory.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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considerate of the access interests of the public and future innovators24—was
viewed as best left to Congress.
A. Efficiency
To be sure, during the run-up to the establishment of the Federal Circuit,
there were many reasons to worry about efficient adjudication. The idea for the
court grew out of two studies, the Freund Commission Report of 1972, which
considered the then-burgeoning docket of the Supreme Court, and the Hurska
Commission Report of 1974, which dealt with workload problem at the
appellate level.25 The commission reports argued that these problems could not
be solved by adding new judges or circuit courts New judges would create
disuniformity within each circuit and thus generate additional appellate work;
new circuits would lead to more circuit splits, thereby increasing pressure at the
Supreme Court. In contrast, channeling a class of cases out of the regional
circuits and into a separate tribunal would both relieve the workload of the other
circuits and generate nationwide rules that would reduce the Supreme Court’s
need to intervene.
Patent law appeared the ideal place to start. Because the law was esoteric
and the facts often extremely complex, lay judges complained about the
disproportionate time spent on the cases. As Learned Hand once put it at the end
of a case about the patentability of purified adrenaline: “I cannot stop without
calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it
possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to
pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of
the resulting evils . . . .”26
The creative industries were unhappy as well. Because the law
encourages innovation with the promise that costs will be recaptured ex post
through national exploitation of successful inventions, industry regarded
uniformity and predictability as critical. Yet there were deep divisions among
the courts adjudicating patent cases. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), which reviewed the PTO, along with some regional circuits, saw
patents as essential to progress. Thus, they were inclined to issue, validate, and

24

For more on the distinction between precision and accuracy in this context, see
Dreyfuss, Specialized Courts, supra note 22, at 5.
25
See REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 573–628 (1973) (named for its Chairman, Professor
Paul A. Freund); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1974) (named
for its Chair, Senator Roman Hruska).
26
See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D. 1911)
(Hand, J.).

enforce these rights.27 Other circuits followed the rather more jaundiced view
Justice Douglas had promoted at the Supreme Court.28 Thus, they were much
more likely to invalidate the patents presented to them.29
Because Supreme Court intervention was sporadic, these differences
could persist for long periods of time. Graham v. John Deere Co. furnishes an
example.30 Congress had codified the judge-made requirement of
nonobviousness in 1952 in an apparent attempt to reduce the high standard for
inventiveness imposed by earlier Supreme Court cases.31 But because Justice
Douglas had considered that high standard to be constitutionally-based,32 the
appellate courts were confused about how to interpret the new statute.
Nonetheless, it took fourteen years for the Supreme Court to step in. Even then it
waffled. On the one hand, the Graham Court stated that “the general level of
innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same [post
codification].”33 On the other hand, it announced a test that could be satisfied by
considerably less inventive advances. The result was chaos: repetitive litigation,
forum shopping, and (arguably) a flight to trade secrecy. 34
27
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“We
have observed a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office
and by the courts. While many reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one
may well be the free rein often exercised by Examiners in their use of the concept of
‘invention.’”).
28
See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (restricting patentable subject matter);
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969) (raising the
standard of nonobviousness); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964) (limiting
the reach of infringement); Schultz v. Moore, 419 U.S. 930, 930 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari on the ground that patents should not be presumed
valid); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154–55
(1950) (Douglas, J., concurring in a judgment of obviousness on the ground that “[t]he
invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific
knowledge.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting from a judgment applying the doctrine of equivalents to
expand patent scope).
29
Dreyfuss, Specialized Courts, supra note 22, at 6–7. For an example of an attempt
to switch between fora with radically different views on patents, see generally Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
30
383 U.S. 1 (1966).
31
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). Prior to that time, the nonobviousness doctrine derived
from Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
32
See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring), cited in
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5).
33
Graham, 383 U.S. at 4–5.
34
See, e.g., Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments:
Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574–75 (1980).
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In this environment, it is clear why Congress would be attracted to the
idea of a specialized patent tribunal. As Howard Markey, destined to be the first
Chief Judge as the Federal Circuit, put it during the hearings on creating the
court: “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are
very good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a number of them,
than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years.”35 In later
writing, he expanded on the advantages of a specialized court: it would produce
a “uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body of law.”36
And, indeed, it has. As the patent bar’s vociferous reaction to Judge
Wood’s proposal suggests, practitioners are largely delighted with the court.37
Arguably, its success accounts for the significant increase in patenting that has
occurred in the years since its founding,38 as well as for the rush of other
countries to create their own specialized intellectual property courts. The
Federal Circuit has, in the words of Randall Rader, Judge Markey’s successor as
chief judge, “accomplished a great mission in bringing uniformity,
predictability, and enforceability to [patent] law.”39

35
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearing on H.R. 2405 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42–43 (1981) [hereinafter Federal Circuit
Hearings] (statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals); see also Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 61–62 (1984)
(stating that creation of CAFC promoted efficiency, flexibility, and uniformity).
36
Hon. Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge
and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985).
37
See, e.g., Ed Reines, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood,
PATENT DOCS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-thefederal-circuit-a-response-to-judge-wood.html, and comments; Beth Z. Shaw, A Dissent
to Chief Judge Wood’s Call to Remove Exclusive Patent Appeal Jurisdiction from
Federal
Circuit,
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
(Oct.
18, 2013),
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2013/10/18/a-dissent-to-chief-judge-woods-call-to-removeexclusive-patent-appeal-jurisdiction-from-federal-circuit/; Comments following Debra
Cassens Weiss, What the Dixie Chicks and Robin Thicke Know About Fixing the Patent
System,
ABA
JOURNAL
(Oct.
8,
2013,
7:43
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/what_the_dixie_chicks_and_robin_thicke_know
_about_fixing_the_patent_system/; Tony Dutra, Donald Dunner Rejects Call for Ending
Exclusive Federal Circuit Patent Jurisdiction, 87 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 220
(Nov. 26, 2013).
38
Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 507.
39
Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The
Promise and Perils of a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,
3 (2001).

B. Quality
Notice, however, what the Federal Circuit jurists did not say. Chief Judge
Markey would do your brain surgery quicker—not better. Chief Judge Rader
claims uniformity, predictability, and enforceability—not responsiveness to
congressional purpose or public policy. Indeed, the history of the court is replete
with judicial denial that law responsive to social interests is its objective. As
Judge Alan Lourie has said, “not once have we had a discussion as to what
direction the law should take.”40 In keeping with Judge Wood’s comment about
differences in the Federal Circuit’s processes,41 the tribunal is also largely
dismissive of academic scholarship42 and even Supreme Court guidance.43 The
result is evident in the court’s decisions. They are formalistic and rigid, with a
heavy emphasis on bright line rules.44
Once again, nonobviousness is a good example. To bring uniformity and
predictability to lower court decision-making, the Federal Circuit’s early
decisions insisted that when an invention involved contributions based on
multiple sources, the literature must include a “teaching, suggestion, or
motivation” to combine the sources in order for the invention to be considered
obvious in light of the references. The inflexibility of the approach led to a long
series of cases like In re Dembiczak,45 where the Federal Circuit found an orange
leaf bag printed with the face of a jack o’lantern patentable because the prior
art—ordinary leaf bags, a book describing how to stuff a sandwich bag and paint
a jack o’lantern on it—did not include a suggestion to combine. These decisions
certainly produced predictable results in that most patents were upheld against
obviousness challenges. However, the Supreme Court, increasingly worried

40

Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 22 (Nov. 2, 2007); see, e.g., Dreyfuss, Continuing Experiment, supra note 22; see
also Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 762–65 (2004); Judge Lourie Provides Tips for Patent
Appeals to Federal Circuit, 67 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 501 (Apr. 2,
2004) (stating that that lawyers should “[a]void emphasis on policy and legislative history
. . . . ‘Such arguments telegraph to us that you’ll probably lose on the law.’”).
41
See Shuchman, supra note 4.
42
Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 667, 678–83
(2002) (finding that the regional circuits cite scholarship roughly four times as often as
the Federal Circuit).
43
See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader Says KSR Didn’t Change Anything, I
Disagree, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/06/chiefjudge-rader-says-ksr-didnt-change-anything-i-disagree/id=19603/.
44
See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010); John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
45
See 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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about patent thickets,46 eventually stepped in. In KSR v. Teleflex,47 the Court
began by “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals,” and then went
on to criticize the court’s rigidity five more times.48 For its part, however, the
Federal Circuit has barely taken this reversal on board. Indeed, Chief Judge
Rader believes the case changed nothing.49
Thirty years into the Federal Circuit’s existence it may seem curious that
its creators did not worry more about the quality—accuracy—of its decisionmaking. In fact, at the time of the court’s founding, there were concerns about
certain aspects of quality, including capture by the patent industries, tunnel
vision, and the willingness of smart jurists to serve.50 Congress responded by
broadening the court’s jurisdiction to encompass other areas of law and by
giving it case (rather than issue) jurisdiction.51
Interestingly, however, percolation was not considered an important
component of the judicial process. To the contrary, in the statutory context, the
leading proceduralists of the day saw percolation as a negative:
As applied to judicial interpretations of federal statutes, “percolation” is a
euphemism for incoherence. The argument has the earmark of being an
effort to put a good face on a bad situation. Whatever modest value there
may be in these regional discrepancies as to federal statutory provisions,
the benefit is outweighed by the cost to the system and to American
citizens. . . . The percolation that produces intercircuit inconsistencies and
46
Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari in a case about patentable subject
matter) (“sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts’”).
47
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
48
Id. at 415, 419 (twice), 421, 422, 428.
49
See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 43. For an example, see C.W. Zumbiel Co., Inc. v.
Kappos, 702 F.3d 1371, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J., dissenting). This is not,
however, to say that Judge Rader is correct in his assessment of outcomes. See Jason
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2012) (showing differences between pre- and post-KSR
decisions). However there are other examples of the court’s intransigence. See, for
example, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002),
where the Supreme Court granted certiorari because it did not think the Federal Circuit
had followed its mandate in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 39 n.8 (1997) to implement the Court’s approach to the doctrine of equivalents. See
also Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), which the Court
took to prevent the Federal Circuit from eviscerating the decision in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007), to facilitate challenges to patent licenses.
MedImmmune was heard for similar reasons: otherwise, the Federal Circuit would have
eviscerated the decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
50
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003).
51
See Dreyfuss, supra note 7.

incoherence may provide intellectual stimulation for academicians, but in
the world of human activity it works costly inequities.52

To these thinkers, settling statutory questions was more important than
getting them right.53 Presumably, getting questions decided correctly was the
province of the legislature. As long as the law was uniform and predictable,
Congress could always correct mistakes by amending the legislation to clarify
its import.
The Federal Circuit experience suggests, however, the proceduralists’
assumption of legislative oversight is flawed. In part, the problem may be patent
law. Although invention is by its very nature disruptive, patent policy may not
have the political salience that draws immediate legislative attention to the
problems of adapting old law to new technology and business practices.
Furthermore, while there may have been a time when the patent industries were
united enough to agree on legislation and move its passage, there are now deep
divisions among various sectors.54 Industries such as the pharmaceutical industry
that use discrete patents to protect individual and easily reverse-engineered
products, do not see the problems experienced by the electronics and
information technology industries, where products often involve multiple
patents, some with claims of unclear scope. Both are differently positioned from
biotechnology, where many inventions are in Pasteur’s Quadrant and have both
upstream (research) use and downstream applications, which confound
prescriptive approaches to infringement.

52

Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 634 (1989); see also HENRY
J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION : A GENERAL VIEW 161–62 (Columbia Univ. Press
1973), cited in Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit: A Model for
Reform?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 583 (2010) (noting that the lack of sub-Supreme
Court capacity for “authoritative determination” of statutory issues was the most
significant question facing the judicial system); Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the
Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690 (1990) (“percolation is not a purposeful
project. It is just a way of postponing decision”); Erwin M. Griswold, The Federal Courts
Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 409 (1987) (“‘the
law’ has become a gossamer web with very little in it on which a lawyer or judge can
firmly and safely rely”).
53
Carrington & Orchard, supra note 52, at 583.
54
Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced
Proposal, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 711 (2005); Jay P. Kesan & Thomas S. Ulen,
Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 58 (2001)
(attempts at patent reform can be compared with the description of industry cooperation
over copyright reform); see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); see, e.g., WILLIAM KINGSTON, BEYOND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY : MATCHING INFORMATION PROTECTION TO INNOVATION 87
(2010) (citing Judge Rich as explaining that “The [1952] Patent Act was written basically
by patent lawyers . . . . A good 95% of the members [of Congress] never knew that the
legislation was under consideration, or that it had passed, let alone what it contained”).
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The problem, however, likely goes well beyond patent law. In the
statutory context, it can be difficult to fix individual mistakes legislatively, for
the fix can distort other provisions in the statute. Furthermore, it may be
misconstrued by the courts Consider, for example, business method patents.
Patents on business techniques were almost unknown until the Federal Circuit
decided State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., which held that
any advance that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result is patentable.55
The absence of a literature on business methods in the PTO (or, in fact,
anywhere else) meant that many business techniques that had long been
practiced suddenly became subject to patent rights. The resulting possibilities
for infringement produced its own little havoc. As Forbes magazine put it in
connection with Priceline’s patent for matching travelers to hotel rooms:
Cool! Jay Walker has apparently patented the ‘business method’ known as
a Dutch auction – a method by which the U.S. Treasury sells hundreds of
billions of dollars’ worth of securities each year.56

The problem quickly came to Congress’s attention. But rather than do the hard
work of drawing up legislation to target the sorts of advances that should not be
protectable, Congress fixed the problem with a band-aid. It grafted onto the
statute a provision to exempt prior users of business methods from infringement
liability.57 The provision was not the subject of significant litigation. However,
when the Supreme Court tried, in Bilski v. Kappos, to clean up the mess that
business method patents produced, the provision stood in its way. Rather than
see it as expressing legislative skepticism about the need for these patents,
Justice Scalia interpreted it as congressional approval of business method
patenting.58 The fractured decision in Bilski later required the Supreme Court to
hear another business method case to clarify when these advances are
patentable.59
Centralizing adjudication has two other problems. First, while a national
rule may be better at drawing the legislature’s attention to a problem, it deprives
lawmakers of experience with alternative approaches. For example, had more
55

149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Readers
Say,
FORBES
(May
31,
1999),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/0531/6311018a.html. (statement by Byron L. Winn).
57
35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2006).
58
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (“A conclusion that business
methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render § 273 meaningless. This
would violate the canon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that
would render another provision superfluous.”); see also OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just
Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401–02 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (interpreting the meaning of a
legislative amendment designed to improve internal communication within firms in a
way that inhibits the free flow of information outside firms).
59
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134
S. Ct. 734 (Mem) (2013) (No. 13-298).
56

than one court confronted claims to business methods, the legislature could have
compared experience in jurisdictions that recognized these patents with results
in places that did not.60 Second, centralization can change the court’s perception
of its relationship to Congress. The reaction to patent assertion entities (so-called
patent trolls) is telling. As noted earlier, Federal Circuit adjudication is highly
formalistic. But some judges have not been content with blind fidelity to the
plain meaning of statutory language. When Congress tried to deal with the
problems posed by opportunistic litigation—a problem the Federal Circuit
arguably created through its liberal attitude towards injunctive and monetary
relief61—then-Chief Judge Michel took the somewhat unusual step of personally
going up to Capitol Hill and (successfully) persuaded Congress to retain the
remedies provisions of the 1952 Act.62

II. PERCOLATION VS. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
Experience with the Federal Circuit is, in short, a lesson on the
relationship between statutes and judge-made law. The legislature is not as well
positioned to oversee the implementation of legislation as the proceduralists of
the late twentieth century assumed; high quality judicial decisions appear to be
necessary to a well-functioning statutory system and dissatisfaction with the
Federal Circuit’s output suggests that percolation is a key to quality. As Judge
Wood argues, percolation encourages more persuasive writing—which arguably
requires harder thinking about the contents of decisions. It also provides input to
sister circuits and signals to the Supreme Court when to step in to hear a case.
The availability of multiple courts creates a way for litigants to revisit an issue
without offending the judges who decided it in the first place. John Duffy and
Craig Nard note another advantage: an early decision in one court can spur the
lawyers in subsequent cases to find better arguments.63 Finally, as I argued in my
article on percolation, multiple adjudications can wash out the framing and

60

Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Co., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366 (2013) (comparing
experience on the circuits that recognized international exhaustion and those that did not);
id. at 1389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting and making a similar comparison).
61
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2141 (2013).
62
See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing on S. 1145 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 278 (2007) (submission for the record of
Paul
Michel,
C.J.),
available
at
http://www.patentreform.info/Emails%20from%20JM/Senate%20hearing%20June%206,
%202007.pdf; Letter from Paul Michel to Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Specter
(June 13, 2007), available at http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/98/2007/06/Michel-letter-to-Senators-6-13-071.pdf.
63
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1633 (2007).
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anchoring effects that can make for bad law and it can provide opportunities to
see how different approaches work in practice.64
Hence Judge Wood’s suggestion that appellants be given a choice
between the regional circuit overseeing the district court where the case was
decided and the Federal Circuit. She paints an especially attractive picture with
her example of the software industry. Noting the problems this sector is
encountering and Dan Burk and Mark Lemley’s comments on how badly the
law is currently tailored to that industry, she argues that the Ninth Circuit, where
a disproportionate share of software cases arise, would be extremely well
positioned to find law responsive to those innovating in this space.65 In fact, the
Ninth Circuit may be better positioned than the Federal Circuit, for while there
are judges on the Federal Circuit with prior experience in various technical
fields, no one on the current bench has a background in computer science. Once
the Ninth Circuit speaks, its opinion (or subsequent experience) can influence
other courts grappling with software questions. At some point, courts will
converge on that solution or the Supreme Court will create a nationwide rule.
Further, if successful, the approach might be expanded to other sectors with
similar characteristics. Judge Wood also suggests that she would welcome
reintegration of patent cases into her circuit. Because of the Seventh Circuit’s
preeminence in antitrust law, its participation could make an important
contribution in restoring the balance between exclusive rights and competition.66
A. Assessing Judge Wood’s Position
The question Judge Wood’s proposal raises is whether the quality benefits
of the sort of percolation envisioned by the Evarts Act outweigh the potential
losses in efficiency, which, as we saw, was Congress’s prime objective in
establishing the Federal Circuit. Surely, there will be losses. Convergence will
not be automatic and in the meantime, circuit splits and forum shopping are

64

Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 524–26 (discussing Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make
Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884–85 (2006)). For an example of experience-based
decision-making, see Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1366–67, 1389–90 (2013), which considers
the question whether copyright law recognizes an international exhaustion doctrine by
looking at the experience of circuits that had adopted opposing approaches. See also id. at
1366–67; id. at 1389–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65
Wood, supra note 2, at 10 (citing Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577–78 (2003)).
66
See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33–34 (2006)
(heavily criticizing the Federal Circuit’s approach); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223,
2230–37 (2013) (coming to a different conclusion on reverse-payments from the one
announced by the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

inevitable.67 These splits are likely to be more disruptive than they are in other
kinds of cases. In ordinary circuit splits, the parties know where they do
business and thus have some basis on which to predict what law will govern
their behavior. Even if the prediction is wrong, they will know the applicable
law as soon as a suit commences. In Judge Wood’s system, the parties learn the
applicable law only after one of them loses and chooses where to appeal.
Not only will this make planning primary conduct problematic, it will
make litigation extremely difficult. If, for example, the Federal and regional
circuits were to take different views on claim construction (a hotly contested
area68), it will be impossible for the district judge to know, at the time of the
trial, what evidence on infringement will be considered relevant to the court of
appeals.69 Worse, the incentives at trial could become very peculiar indeed. If
the patentee (or patent troll) knows the Federal Circuit is likely to look at its
case more favorably than courts more closely attuned to social policy, it may
prefer to try the case halfheartedly, with the idea that it would be better to lose at
trial and obtain the right to choose the appellate court than to win at trial and
lose on appeal in a court chosen by its adversary.
Finally, Judge Wood’s proposal does not account for appeals from the
PTO. These will significantly increase under the AIA because the statute
includes several new procedures for challenging issued patents
administratively.70 Presumably, appeals from these adjudications will continue
to be heard by the Federal Circuit. But, as we saw, Congress was motivated to
create the Federal Circuit in part because of the “notorious differences” between
the law laid down by the CCPA and the regional circuits. If the Federal Circuit
67

Significantly, forum shopping for a favorable district court persists despite the
existence of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1444, 1462–68 (2010).
68
See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Doctrine, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed. 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909028 (analyzing all
observable Federal Circuit claim construction opinions between 1996 and 2007); David
L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (analyzing Federal Circuit
reversal rates of U.S. district court judges on claim construction issues); Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005)
(examining two different doctrines of claim construction); cf. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted. 82 U.S.L.W. 3469 (Mar. 31,
2014) (No. 13-854) (raising the question of the degree of deference to be accorded to
district court claim constructions).
69
See, e.g., CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (refusing to grant a new trial after the Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court
on claim construction). Presumably, the appellate route problem is the reason the Federal
Circuit defers to the regional circuits on procedural rules that do not implicate patent law
questions. See, e.g., Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
70
35 U.S.C. §§ 257(a), 311, 321 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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and regional circuits fail to converge on particular positions, then this
differential will also recur. As with the trial judges, the PTO would have no way
to predict what court will hear the appeal of an enforcement action and
ultimately consider whether a patent it has issued is valid.
It is also unclear whether the benefits will be as great as Judge Wood
envisions. Foremost is the possibility of selection effects. While patentees will
probably prefer appeals to the Federal Circuit, alleged infringers with defenses
sounding in public policy will likely choose a regional circuit. That will leave
the Federal Circuit hearing even fewer cases involving weighty social interests
and could make the court even less receptive to taking countervailing
considerations into account.
In addition, the Federal Circuit may be as reluctant to follow a regional
court’s view as it is to follow Supreme Court decisions. To be sure, the circuit is
in a curious position vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court tends to
grant certiorari when the Federal Circuit hears cases en banc and issues multiple
opinions. In that situation, reluctance to conform to Supreme Court mandates is
not surprising as almost every judge will have staked out a position in writing. It
will be much easier to converge with, say, the Ninth Circuit on an issue that the
Federal Circuit judges have not already exhaustively argued. At the same time
however, the court also has a very firm belief in its own expertise. As former
Chief Judge Michel once said, “There’s . . . a certain amount of suspicion that
there might be some deeper immersion, deeper familiarity, harder thinking and
greater exposure [to patent law] at the Federal Circuit than the Supreme Court
itself can offer.”71 Whether the court would be willing to believe that other
circuits have more expertise in issues touching on patent law is an open
question.
Most significantly, the Wood proposal does not truly duplicate the kind of
percolation created by the Evarts Act. Because the route of appeal is
indeterminate, it does not allow for experimentation across either technological
or geographic variables. While Judge Wood is surely right that enlarging the
epistemic community would enhance quality, in an empirical age, evidencebased decision-making is increasingly valued.72 Sacrificing uniformity without
creating “laboratories of experimentation” seems like a lost opportunity.
Clearly, Judge Wood believes that the gains in quality are worth any
concomitant loss in efficiency. She presents three arguments. First, she does not
believe the loss in efficiency is likely to be significant. She notes that there are
71
Roy Zwahlen, Mayo v. Prometheus: Thought Leaders Express Concern and
Evaluate the Impact, BIOTECHNOW (May 21, 2012), http://www.biotechnow.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2012/05/mayo-v-prometheus-thought-leadersexpress-concern-evaluate-business-impact-and-discuss-the-future.
72
See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2015),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294774.

some patent issues that even now are resolved outside the Federal Circuit. She
points to cases like the recent Gunn v. Minton,73 which use the well-pleaded
complaint rule to direct cases raising patent issues tangentially or in the
defense’s case, to other tribunals. She notes that these adjudications do not
significantly affect uniformity. Second, she would avoid inconsistent
interpretations of the same patent by relying on the JPML to select a single
forum to hear all the cases involving the same invention.74 Third, she argues that
the “Federal Circuit would still play a leading role in shaping patent law.” Here,
she relies on the adjudication of administrative law cases, where the regional
circuits tend to adhere to the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence.75
These arguments are not persuasive. Gunn is a patent malpractice case.
While the case raises a question on the applicability of the experimental use
exception to the on-sale bar of the 1952 Patent Act,76 the answer is to be
supplied by a state court in the context of determining whether failure to raise
the exception caused the patentee to lose its case. Whatever the decision, it will
not create disuniformity because no one will be bound by the holding on the
patent law issue. There are so few such cases in any one state, the decision is
also not likely to affect very many litigants through stare decisis. In contrast, the
cases Judge Wood envisions the regional circuits deciding will bind the patentee
and its licensees,77 and create federal precedent that will affect future cases, at
least in the same circuit. During the Federal Circuit’s early years, patent issues
appearing in compulsory counterclaims were heard in the regional circuits,
where they had a similar effect. It is not insignificant that the AIA changed that
approach to promote uniformity.78
Judge Wood’s idea for having the JPML consolidate cases involving the
same patent in the same appellate court is also problematic. Apparently, she
assumes that challenges to the same patent occur simultaneously (as with some
mass torts). But that is not necessarily so: as long as the patentee wins the first
case, it will live to enforce the same patent in subsequent proceedings for the

73

133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066–68 (2012).
Wood, supra note 2, at 9.
75
Id. at 10.
76
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102(b), 66 Stat. 792, 797 (current version at 35
U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (current through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L 113-76, 113-79, and
113-89)).
77
See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. Ill. Found’n, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
78
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–
354 (2002) (leaving compulsory counterclaims to appeal in the regional circuits). The
AIA changed the procedure, providing that:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a
party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
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duration of the life of the patent.79 Presumably, the JPML could channel later
cases to whatever court heard the first one. However, that possibility only
intensifies the incentives problem at trial. Even the patentee who is confident in
the first case of a win on any circuit, may worry about the arguments that later
litigants might assert. If so, the patentee will prefer to find a way to acquire the
right to choose the route of appeal in the first case so that it can subject later
litigants to the same court. To be sure, all choices made by the JPML are
somewhat coercive, but in the usual case, the choice is not preordained by an
adversary’s strategic manipulation in earlier litigation.
It is harder to evaluate Judge Wood’s third argument on the Federal
Circuit’s leading role in patent jurisprudence. At the same hearing at which
Judge Markey testified about brain surgery, it was opined that patent cases were
“the most unattractive thing about being a Federal judge.”80 A court unhappy to
be stuck with such a case might well convince itself that the best course would
be to defer to the Federal Circuit’s alleged expertise.81 A decision to defer would
certainly make for greater uniformity, and eliminate forum shopping and skewed
incentives at trial. But it would not create a dialogue. To improve quality, the
regional circuits would have to refrain from following Federal Circuit precedent
in cases of national importance. Or, at least, the Federal Circuit would have to
be worried enough about the possibility to write more persuasively. However,
the fear of being overruled by the Supreme Court has not led to more thoughtful
output.82 Perhaps the fear of disuniformity would be a better motivator than the
fear of Supreme Court reversal (which the Federal Circuit has shown itself to be
adept at ignoring). But to make the threat credible, the regional courts will have
to do some branching out on their own, and that will reintroduce the
inefficiencies that plagued the system in the 1980s.
B. A Changing Landscape
Arguably, however, the system can better tolerate these inefficiencies
now. The docket problems that were the object of the Freund and Hruska
Commissions’ studies appear to have abated. There is considerable controversy

79
See, e.g., CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1162 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (noting that the same patent had been the subject of litigation a year earlier);
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (noting that two litigations
over the same patent had occurred nine years apart).
80
Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 35, at 46 (statement of Rep. Sawyer).
81
Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343,
405 (2012).
82
See generally Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271 (2013).

as to the current workload of the courts of appeals,83 but the backlog in judicial
appointments makes it difficult to accurately assess whether there are enough
judgeships to meet the nation’s needs. Obviously, however, Chief Judge Wood
believes that her circuit could absorb some patent cases without undue hardship.
At the Supreme Court, the situation is clearer: the docket is significantly smaller
than it was in the 1980’s.84 Furthermore, the Court has been hearing several
patent cases each Term for more than a decade.85 Disagreement among the
regional circuits and the Federal Circuit could therefore be resolved more
quickly today than in the Graham era. In fact, these splits would probably be
better at directing the Court’s attention to important national issues than the
current practice of relying on dissents and en bancs in the Federal Circuit.86 As
Dembiczak illustrated, the judges of the Federal Circuit can be in agreement on a
rule that is less than ideal from a social perspective.
As to the benefits, it is also possible that past experience with the Federal
Circuit is not helpful in predicting how amenable the Federal Circuit would be
to percolation in the future. Several new judges have joined the court, and these
jurists have backgrounds significantly more varied than those of the earlier
judges.87 That is, the first generation of judges came from the CCPA and the
United States Court of Claims.88 Both tribunals had limited jurisdiction and
rarely (or in the case of the CCPA, never) entertained infringement actions.
Accordingly, no one on the court had enjoyed the opportunity to focus
systematically on the impact of patenting on creative production. Several judges
in the second generation were drawn from legislative circles. They joined Judge
Rich, one of the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act.89 Arguably, these jurists had a
predilection for adhering closely to the legislative language their former
employers (or they themselves) had drafted. As I have earlier argued, the judges
in both these groups may have also seen formalism as a way to establish

83
See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking A Devil’s Bargain: The Federal
Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 473 (2009); Chad M. Oldfather, Limitations (A Response to Judge Posner), 51 DUQ.
L. REV. 67 (2013).
84
See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme
Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1363, 1373–74 (2006).
85
See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 510 nn.42–43 (tracking the cases by Term).
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See Stephenson, supra note 82, at 286–87.
87
See Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited March 14, 2014).
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See generally Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected
Rebirth of Regional Circuit Jurisdiction over Patent Appeals and the Need for
Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 411 (2003).
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See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 22, at 822; Donald R. Dunner, Giles
Sutherland Rich, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 71, 71 (1999).
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legitimacy—or at least as a way to refrain from ruffling the feathers of important
interest groups.90
The newest generation is different. Kathleen O’Malley is the first Federal
Circuit judge to have previously served on a federal district court, Evan Wallach
was elevated from the Court of International Trade, and Raymond Chen was
formerly Solicitor at the PTO.91 Not only have these three experienced first-hand
the costs of the court’s rigidity, they have joined the court almost
simultaneously. Indeed, since 2010, six of the twelve seats on the Federal
Circuit have changed hands.92 While one new judge may have a difficult time
altering the karma of a courthouse, a 50% turnover creates a cohort better able to
withstand pressure to pursue “business as usual.” Thus, as with immigrant
families,93 the third generation may integrate more fully into the larger judicial
culture. It may be more willing to adopt processes similar to those of the other
circuits, more receptive to policy arguments, and more disposed to engage in
dialogue with other courts and with scholars, federal agencies, and other
institutions.94
At the same time, however, the changing landscape can cut two ways. On
the one hand, new developments suggest that Judge Wood’s proposal would
work better than past experience predicts—it would be less costly because the
Supreme Court could end splits quickly and it would be more productive of
discourse because the new judges may be receptive to arguments that prior
generations dismissed. On the other hand, these changes also make it less
necessary to implement the Wood proposal. The new judges may shake up the
status quo without introducing disuniformity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s
greater availability enlarges opportunities for dialogue. Patentable subject matter
90
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is a good example: after Justice Breyer announced his doubts about expanding
the ambit of patent law in Lab Corp. v. Metabolite,95 the Supreme Court heard
three subject matter cases and granted certiorari in a fourth.96 One of these cases
went up and down twice, and thus created considerable interchange with the
Federal Circuit.97
By the same token, as the dependence of the economy on knowledge
production has become evident, Congress has become much more attentive to
patent policy. The AIA made many significant changes in the statute in 2011
and other modifications are under consideration.98 Thus, the assumption of the
early proceduralists may, in the end, turn out to be closer to the truth. Even if
not, patent law is certainly receiving greater attention elsewhere. In the last few
years, the Solicitor General’s office, the National Institutes of Health, the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National
Economic Council, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and the
Federal Trade Commission have expanded the community debating patent
policy. 99 Increasing numbers of amicus briefs also supply the court with valuable
information about broader social interests.100
In evaluating the Wood proposal, it is also worth noting that in the last
thirty years, significant changes have occurred that raise the costs of
disuniformity. Whereas in earlier times, the need for uniformity arose
principally because of the interstate nature of patent exploitation, there has been
a revolution in the conduct of research, development, and manufacturing.
Invention is less a matter of relying on in-house staff scientists, and more of a
collaborative enterprise, involving geographically dispersed participants in ever95
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changing affiliations.101 Some industries have adopted a value-chain
development and manufacturing strategy, which can similarly involve actors in
many different locations.102 Furthermore, the Internet has facilitated peer
production, with participants drawn from all over the nation (or the world).103 In
all of these cases, predictable law is key. Without knowing what law will apply
to their behavior, it is impossible for participants in these arenas to determine
rights or freedom to operate. And because venue rules have changed since the
Federal Circuit was created, these actors are much more vulnerable to aggressive
forum shopping.104 Taking these costs and the uncertain benefits of Judge
Wood’s proposal into account, the best course may be to wait, at least a few
years, to see how the new bench performs before destroying the exclusivity
Congress worked so hard to create.

CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Wood has performed a valuable service in reviving the
debate over the wisdom of channeling all patent appeals to the Federal Circuit.
She paints an appealing picture of the benefits of reintroducing circuit dialogue
into the adjudicatory process. Changes in the composition of the Federal Circuit
and in the attentiveness of Congress and the Supreme Court to patent problems
make her proposal especially viable. However, these factors may also render her
proposal unnecessary. More important, the AIA raises many new questions. But
because the Wood proposal makes neither technological or territorially
distinctions, experimenting with different solutions to these problems would not
be possible. Better, then, would be to see whether the newly-composed Federal
Circuit and greater national focus on innovation changes the dynamics of
deliberation internally or in relation to the Supreme Court or to other entities
engaged in thinking about innovation. A reconstituted PTO, the district court
101
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BIOTECHNOLOGY 131, 141, 143, 152 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005); Rochelle Cooper
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pilot program, and the newly-created foreign analogues to the Federal Circuit
will also enlarge the epistemic community and create opportunities for natural
experiments without significantly sacrificing predictability. Admittedly, these
experiments will affect uniformity, but they do so in ways with which the
parties—who know which districts and technologies they work with—can cope.
Perhaps these developments will not make a difference: at that point, it will be
worthwhile to reconsider Chief Judge Wood’s proposal. But while we got along
without exclusivity before we met the Federal Circuit, it would be a pity to get
along with it just yet.

